Attila Holoda: Ukraine can help Hungary diversify away from Russian oil

— Hungary is still often described as highly dependent on Russian energy, especially Russian crude oil. Based on your assessment, how would you explain this dependence today?

— Historically, Hungary was indeed dependent on the infrastructure inherited from the Soviet period. If you look at natural gas, for a long time Hungary had only one major gas connection, linked to the former Soviet pipeline system. It was only from the 2000s onward that Hungary started building interconnections with neighboring countries and integrating more closely with European infrastructure.

In the case of crude oil, the Druzhba pipeline is still in operation. Historically, both Hungarian and Slovak refineries were optimized to process Russian crude oil.

But today I would not describe this simply as technical or commercial dependence. In my view, it has increasingly become a political dependence. This political dependence has clearly increased under Viktor Orbán’s government.

The European Union granted temporary exemptions precisely to give countries time to adapt and diversify. If this dependence persists, or even deepens over time, then it reflects a policy priority rather than pure necessity.

Of course, the commercial argument also plays a role. Russian crude, especially Urals, was cheaper than other alternatives. But that does not fully explain the lack of diversification efforts.

If I remember correctly, 10 or 15 years ago, when Hungary adopted a new energy strategy, the declared aim was to reduce dependence on Russian oil, strengthen links with neighboring countries, and connect more deeply to European infrastructure. But in recent years, Orbán’s government has not reduced this dependence. On the contrary, it has increased it.

— How would you describe MOL’s point of view? What was, in your opinion, the real difficulty in moving away from Russian crude oil?

— MOL, which owns the refineries in both Hungary and Slovakia, has always said that these refineries were historically optimized for Russian crude and that this technical optimization cannot easily be changed. But I do not think this is entirely true.

Russian crude is itself a blend, a mixture. If MOL wanted to create a similar mixture, there would be several other options. They could buy seaborne crude or crude from other sources and create the blend they need.

Another issue is the complexity of the refineries, especially the Hungarian and Slovak ones. They are highly complex refineries. But in my view, that also means they should be capable of processing different types of crude oil.

The real answer, in my opinion, is that Russian oil was cheaper than other alternatives. But Hungarian consumers who filled their cars at petrol stations did not receive cheaper gasoline or diesel. MOL operates in the Central European market, and its pricing policy was broadly in line with its competitors.

So I think MOL was able to achieve very high profitability because of cheaper Urals crude. That is why, in my view, there was no real effort to reduce dependence on Russian oil.

— The Druzhba pipeline is often discussed not only as an energy route, but also as a political instrument. Recent disputes have shown that it can quickly become a tool of leverage. In your view, how much political leverage does Druzhba give to Russia, Hungary, or Slovakia?

— I think it is both: an energy route and a political instrument.

Druzhba remains a key physical supply route for the Hungarian and Slovak markets. But it has also clearly evolved into a tool of political leverage.

Recent disruptions involving the Druzhba pipeline showed how quickly oil flows can become part of sanctions debates, transit disputes, and bargaining between EU member states.

In that sense, Druzhba is no longer just infrastructure. It is part of a broader geopolitical system of interdependence and pressure.

— The Croatian Adria / JANAF route is usually presented as the main alternative to Druzhba. Can this route stand on its own, or would it be safer for Hungary and Slovakia to have more than one route for non-Russian crude supplies?

— This is a very important question. I would emphasize that among European refineries, only around 14% have access to two pipeline supply routes. This includes Hungarian, Slovak, former East German, and Polish refineries.

Most European refineries have only one connection. From this point of view, having another connection to the Adriatic Sea is good for Hungary. I would describe it as a complementary option alongside the Druzhba pipeline.

Of course, there has been a long debate between Croatian officials and MOL over whether the capacity of this pipeline is sufficient to supply both refineries. But after the recent problems with Druzhba in Ukraine, it was demonstrated that MOL could use the JANAF / Adria route without major problems.

They ordered seaborne crude oil and supplied both refineries, including the Bratislava refinery. This was a clear demonstration that the Adria pipeline is a very useful tool for increasing diversification.

If the Druzhba pipeline could be used not only for Russian-origin crude, and if the Odesa–Brody pipeline system were reconstructed or brought back into use, that would create another opportunity for Hungarian and Slovak refineries.

Through the port of Odesa, they could access not only Russian-origin crude, but also Central Asian sources, such as Azerbaijani or Kazakh crude oil. An additional route via Odesa–Brody would add redundancy and flexibility to diversification efforts.

— That was actually my next question. Could the Odesa–Brody route complement the Adria / JANAF route? And could such a route be presented to Hungary not as a Ukrainian demand, but as an advantage for Hungarian energy security?

— Yes. Hungary does not have sufficient mineral resources of its own, so it will remain dependent on imports in the long term. But imports must be diversified. I mean not only routes, but also sources.

I always say that if there is only one seller from whom you buy your oil or gas, and only that seller supplies you, then after some time you begin to serve the interests of that seller.

Energy independence does not mean that you supply yourself only from your own resources. It means that you diversify your routes and your sources.

In that sense, I think it is important for Hungary to preserve opportunities through Ukraine — perhaps, in the longer term, not for Russian-based oil, but for other Central Asian crude.

The same applies to gas supplies. Today, Hungary has become an important transit country in Central Europe. Through Hungary, gas is supplied even to Ukraine and Slovakia. This is very important for us.

In the coming years, new resources may enter the European gas market, for example from Romania. This is a good opportunity for Hungary to use its strong position in Central Europe as a transit country.

From this perspective, it is very important to maintain more friendly and closer relations with all neighboring countries. I think this is the only way forward. Any new Hungarian government, in my view, should follow this strategy.

— If this route is to be implemented in practice, what steps should be taken to make it real rather than just another political idea?

— First of all, we should take into account the current situation on the global energy market.

The problem is not only the war between Russia and Ukraine and the supply difficulties related to Russian oil. There is also the question of what is happening around the Strait of Hormuz, which has a strong impact on the global oil and energy markets.

In this situation, Central European countries, and European countries more broadly, must increase cooperation. No single country can solve these problems alone. These problems have to be addressed together.

There is also another important issue. Ukrainian refineries are not operating now because of Russian bombing. But Ukraine still produces approximately 2 million tonnes of crude oil per year. The question is what to do with this oil.

Ukraine could use neighboring countries such as Poland, Hungary, or Slovakia for refining. In return, Ukraine could receive refined products, which are absolutely necessary, especially during wartime and for the military equipment being used.

So I would say that cooperation among all Central European countries — the former Visegrád Four countries, meaning Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland — should be strengthened in the coming years.

Ukraine is a large country, and hopefully it will move closer and closer to the European Union. Our cooperation should increase in parallel with this process.

— For my last question, let us imagine that you are advising Ukraine. What should Kyiv prepare first to make the Odesa–Brody proposal credible: a technical study, test shipments, talks with MOL and Slovnaft, a tariff proposal, security guarantees? What should be done first?

— The Odesa–Brody pipeline was used before. That means it has already been tested.

Of course, because it has not been used frequently in recent years, some reconstruction work and technical checks would be necessary.

In my view, it would be a very good signal if Ukraine invited Slovak and Hungarian experts to work on this together. We need to demonstrate trust in each other. Without trust, we cannot move forward.

It would be a very important step if Ukrainian officials officially offered this opportunity to Central European countries and invited them to review and analyze the feasibility of these alternative routes together.

The route should be checked and developed jointly. That would be a strong signal from Ukrainian officials and the Ukrainian government.