Russia is waging a war of attrition in a technological and tactical stalemate: the “death zone” of up to ~80 km suppresses maneuvering, while advancing in small groups yields hundreds of meters per week and serves the strategy of exhaustion. The turning point lies in increasing the range and power of strikes: intensifying fire in the 80-kilometer zone, systematic strikes at 200–300 km on warehouses and logistics, as well as at 1000+ km on the “heart” of the Russian military industry; in parallel — asymmetric pressure outside the front lines, primarily legal and technological strangulation of the “shadow” tanker fleet.
Geopolitically, the outcome in Ukraine is linked to the Indo-Pacific region: Russia and China are “working together,” Beijing is learning from the Ukrainian war, so the US cannot “switch” to China alone. A “quick peace” based on the formula of “land for peace” or a simple return to the status quo does not solve the Russian problem; what is needed is the rearmament of Europe, alliances with the mandatory participation of Ukraine, and a significant strengthening of Western support as a “profitable deal” that deprives Moscow of any chance of domination in Europe.
This was stated in a lengthy interview with Guildhall by retired US Major General Michael S. Repass, commander of the US European Special Operations Command (2010-2013).
– We’re very interested in your assessment of the situation on the front line. We hear different opinions: some say Ukraine can liberate all its territory; others claim Kyiv could be captured by Russian troops in two or three days. Help us understand what’s actually going on.
– We can eliminate one of those possibilities right away: Kyiv being captured in two or three days is not going to happen, certainly not in my lifetime. As a general assessment, we’ve reached a technological and tactical standoff. Technology has outpaced the tactics available to either side. It is similar to World War I with the advent of the machine gun – armies were not ready for massed fire against light infantry over trench lines. Mechanization changed the nature of warfare, but tactics lagged, causing tremendous casualties. That is where we are now: technology has surpassed tactical capacity on both sides, so losses in personnel and equipment are significant. Positionally, Russia has thrown what appears to be a limitless supply of people and equipment at the eastern front. If you do not care about your people and have abundant equipment, you can do this for a long time. That boils down to a strategy of attrition: firepower over maneuver, prioritizing destruction of the enemy’s capabilities over seizure of terrain. Taking ground is incidental to destroying defenders. With the widespread use of small UAS, you now have a zone in depth – from the front line back to roughly 80 kilometers on each side – so an overall depth where any concentration large enough to overwhelm defenders is quickly detected and met with counter-fires and counter-maneuver. That produces a tactical standoff on the ground. I do not know what it will take to change that, other than a significant technological breakthrough that defeats, at scale and across a broad front, the other side’s electronic warfare and ISR – unmanned aviation and ground sensors. The alternative is to annihilate the forces behind that EW and early sensor net, creating a gap that allows maneuver. In some cases, I see Russia attempting exactly that – surrounding Ukrainian forces, defeating them in detail, then advancing. Russia is not principally concerned with terrain, though they have political goals about it. The intermediate goal is the political boundaries of the five oblasts under attack and occupation; the strategic goal is broader – subjugation of Ukraine. That does not seem achievable by military means alone, so Putin seeks to gain at the negotiating table what he cannot achieve tactically. That is my general assessment.
– Given this war of attrition and the so-called kill zone, Russia often uses small groups – two to four people – moving at night or in low-visibility periods, infiltrating, massing, and then attacking with limited tactical maneuver. With their stated goal of taking Donbas, is this approach feasible in the near term?
– They have likely assessed the time and value of that tactic. To seize all political boundaries – including Kherson’s right bank – would take years using this approach. The aim is not tactical success alone; it is to wear down Ukrainian defenders. They make small gains – 100 or 200 meters a week – but when you have 200 to 300 kilometers to go, that will not achieve the objective quickly. These tactics are incidental to attrition warfare against Ukraine.
– Ukraine has focused on inflicting maximum possible damage on enemy forces. Is that the right approach, and how could it be made more efficient?
– It is the right approach. Efficiency would increase with more firepower at the tactical and operational levels. Tactically: artillery, HIMARS, 80-kilometer rockets – anything that increases destructive power within that roughly 80-kilometer zone is advantageous. Operationally: out to 200 or 300 kilometers into Russia, deep fires are necessary to disrupt marshalling areas, supply depots, rail – which Russia relies on – roads, bridges, and critical infrastructure, including power generation and transmission. Ukraine has been given or developed some systems to reach that far, and new to the discussion since last year is the ability to strike deep inside Russia – over 1,000 kilometers – against strategic infrastructure and war-production facilities that are dispersed and not well covered by air defenses. Russia cannot defend every industrial center. That vulnerability is being exploited by Ukraine’s indigenous long-range capabilities, including converted long-range aircraft used as one-way drones. The innovation has been effective and informative. Any technology or quantity that lets Ukraine engage across the depth – tactical (about 80 km), operational (about 200 to 300 km), and strategic (beyond 1,000 km) – is useful. What has been fielded so far has been used artfully. Given Ukraine’s limited means, performance has been efficient. My recommendations are for Western governments: provide systems that extend range and lethality to reach the most pressing problem sets – Shaheds, Kh-101s, Kinzhals, Iskanders – targets that directly affect Ukraine’s warfighting and civilian resilience. Those targets need to be engaged, and Ukraine currently lacks sufficient technology to do so. I advocate providing it – for example, Germany’s Taurus or U.S. cruise missiles that were recently declined. I disagree with those refusals on military principles, though political constraints have prevailed.
– At the start you mentioned potential “game-changers.” Could long-range cruise missiles be one? Or does it depend on quantity?
– I am skeptical that any single technology will be a game-changer. We thought M777s would be; we thought Abrams and Bradleys would be. They help, but they do not flip the board. I will say something some may find shocking: I do not think this war will be won inside Ukraine’s territory. It will be won asymmetrically – outside Ukraine – by actions that punish Russia, potentially on a global scale and away from the front. That raises the question, where is Russia vulnerable? I ask Ukrainians about the defeat mechanism for Russia – what sequence of events can lead to Russian defeat. Those conversations reinforce my view: the war will be won asymmetrically, beyond the immediate battlefields. Critical Russian assets can be targeted regionally and globally. Industrial capacity requires longer-range, larger-payload strikes – either provided by partners or developed indigenously. Outside the combat zones, Russia is extremely vulnerable in a few areas. One is the so-called ghost fleet of oil tankers. Interdict the pipeline of illicit oil – seize vessels, deny maintenance and refueling, delicense captains and crews. There are non-explosive, non-hazardous technologies to prevent those ships from sailing. The oil becomes indistinguishable once mixed into global markets, so you must hit it in transit. I have also seen actions against Russian interests in far-flung places – Tuareg versus Wagner, for example – very effective. More of that helps, though it is a long game.
– Geopolitically, there is an urge to resolve the war quickly. Are there risks in quick fixes for an existential conflict?
– It is noble to seek peace, and many capitals are working toward it. I will not criticize the effort, but I disagree with some principles – land for peace has never worked; status quo ante does not solve the Russian problem. It is not a Ukrainian problem; it is a Russian problem – one of disarmament and curbing aggressive capacity. Strategically, Europe must rearm. If Europe had been heavily armed and capable, Putin likely would not have attacked, and Europe could have assisted Ukraine more robustly. Land armies once strong have atrophied under other budget priorities. Rebuilding European defense is essential. I also agree with General Budanov: any alliance that excludes the states on the frontline – like Ukraine – is doomed to fail. If a future Russia includes all of Ukraine, Europe faces an existential threat that did not exist before February 2022. Strategic solutions involve political and military alliances, rearming Ukraine and Europe, and sustained vigilance against Russian gray-zone activity in Europe, Africa, and South America – often in league with China. A less-than-comprehensive solution in the name of peace will simply preserve a dangerous world under peacetime conditions.
– The global confrontation spans multiple theaters. RUSI recently published a report analyzing Russia – China agreements, concluding that Russia is deliberately encouraging China to invade Taiwan, hoping to trigger a U.S. – China war. What is your assessment, and what are the implications for the U.S. and Ukraine?
– I generally agree with the conclusions. The report emphasizes provision of an airborne assault capability – lightly mechanized forces parachuting in to seize terrain. I found that interesting, but that capability is limited and unlikely to be used in a Taiwan scenario. I have worked episodically in Taiwan over the last few years – been on the beaches, in the cities, at the airports; I understand the natural and built infrastructure, and I have studied China’s intimidation and rehearsal patterns. Taiwan is densely populated on narrow coastal plains, with a high mountain spine down the center. Most people live along the north, west, and south coasts; the east is less populated. Movement is difficult – elevated roads cross ridgelines to stay straight – so infrastructure is critical. China’s first step would be an air and sea cordon to isolate Taiwan from reinforcement – something they have rehearsed repeatedly. The key question is how long Taiwan can sustain itself under blockade. My estimate is about a week. Without nuclear power, fuel runs out quickly and remaining stocks would be interdicted by Chinese long-range strikes. After roughly 72 hours, fuel becomes the primary constraint, followed by water, sewer, and other essentials – similar to what we have seen in eastern Ukraine. Taiwan then faces a choice: resist and risk devastation, or capitulate to save cities and people. I do not think there is sufficient Western Pacific combat power ready to penetrate a tight blockade quickly; over time, perhaps, but a coup de main after a week or two is conceivable. China has built significant amphibious lift, but troop carriers would be highly vulnerable to Taiwan’s land-based anti-ship missiles (Harpoon and indigenous systems). Some ships would be destroyed; some would get through by sheer numbers. But I would not want to be the commander told to attack into greater Taipei – seven million people in dense high-rises. The strategy is more likely one of submission: blockade to prevent reinforcement, followed by limited invasion to force capitulation. I do not see a battalion-sized parachute assault as decisive in that context.
– Taiwan’s leadership reacted to the RUSI report. Secretary-General Joseph Wu said Russia is preparing China for the military seizure of Taiwan; Deputy Chief of the General Staff Hsieh Jih-sheng said a Ukrainian defeat would signal to China that more aggressive action is possible. Do you share that concern?
– Absolutely. Russia and China are like lips and teeth – they go together. If you want to know how China will fight, look at Ukraine. China is learning from both sides – whatever Russia does successfully and whatever Ukraine does successfully – then integrating it into technology and tactics. What happens in Ukraine will show up in the Western Pacific. Some in my country want to focus solely on China and let Europe handle Ukraine, but the U.S. cannot do that: events in Ukraine directly shape a future Chinese scenario in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Philippines – wherever China gets adventurous.
– Given that linkage, should the United States reconsider its current, relatively limited assistance to Ukraine and largely symbolic pressure on Russia – treating a potential Ukrainian defeat as a strategic threat to the U.S. itself?
– I would not call it existential, but a Russian success would create a threat that could take a century or more to recover from. The truly existential danger is the combination of Russian domination of Europe and Chinese domination of the Western Pacific – and they are actively conspiring toward that end. Whatever we collectively do – the U.S., Ukraine, Europe, and others – to prevent that is in everyone’s interest. Should the U.S. do more? Yes – I have advocated that since before the war. The current U.S. leadership is transactional: I will give you this if you give me that. Here is a transaction: the U.S. gives Ukraine significantly more and better support; Ukraine denies Russia the ability to dominate Europe. That is a very good deal.
– About the announced possible meeting between President Trump and President Putin in Budapest. Setting politics aside, the location is symbolic. In 1994, the U.S., U.K., and Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum on security assurances for Ukraine. Ukraine surrendered the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal – hundreds of ICBMs aimed at U.S. cities – reducing proliferation risks. Russia has grossly violated that memorandum. Chatham House argued in 2023 that Russia’s breach undermined the global nonproliferation regime, and only compelling Russia to fulfill its obligations can help restore it. From the standpoint of that symbolism, what additional steps can the international community take to help restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity?
– When I heard about Budapest, my first reaction was a facepalm – of all places and times. But the symbolism can work in our favor: it reminds us that Putin has abandoned post-WWII agreements – the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Geneva and Hague Conventions, strategic arms treaties, CFE, INF – and the Budapest Memorandum which, while a memorandum, carried the weight of international commitment. He would be standing where his government violated a standing assurance. The lesson is that memoranda do not suffice; nations need positive security measures domestically and regionally to prevent Russia from doing what it is doing now. A second lesson: Russia cannot be trusted to abide by international agreements. If you start from that premise, you design your security architecture to counter whatever Russia attempts. This is an opportunity for the West to make more of the moment than a meeting of three leaders.
– Chatham House also warned that violating Budapest undermines nonproliferation by signaling to non-nuclear states that security without nuclear weapons is not assured – fueling nuclear ambitions, as seen in debates in South Korea and Poland. Do you agree that such violations risk a new nuclear race?
– The U.S. strike on Iran answered a key part of that. Washington unequivocally stated Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, set a deadline for inspections, and enforced consequences. The message is that the U.S. will back up nonproliferation commitments and will not tolerate rogue regimes with nuclear arms. If Iran went nuclear, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would likely follow – exactly the proliferation you are worried about. The recent U.S. stance has pushed back that thinking for now; those states do not need nuclear weapons at this moment. It also reassures allies in Asia regarding North Korea. I do not see Budapest’s violation alone directly triggering proliferation, given these subsequent actions, though the risk always exists.
– General Repass, thank you very much for your time and for a substantial, systematic assessment. We would be honored to have you next time.
– I look forward to coming back. Thanks for having me. I appreciate well-thought-out, insightful questions – you get much more from a conversation like this than from something easy and non-controversial. It is an honor.
Guildhall, exclusively.
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