The strong result of Rumen Radev’s political force in the Bulgarian elections can be explained by a persistent public demand for a paternalistic model of власти, support from part of the pro-Russian electorate, and the attitudes of Generation Z, which proved to be significantly less pro-European than had been assumed. This was stated in an interview with Guildhall by Bulgarian analyst Rumena Filipova.
— What, in your view, explains Radev’s strong result?
— I think there are several reasons for such a strong result. First of all, these are deeply ingrained attitudes within Bulgarian society. In the past, I conducted research on the appeal of the “strong leader” model in Bulgaria.
That model still has a very strong appeal for Bulgarian voters. In general, they tend to support a paternalistic type of leadership. I would say that Borisov’s long stay in power can also be explained by this.
Now his party has lost a significant share of support. But I think this happened because another “strong leader” appeared on the political scene. Previously, the parties of change, which offered a different model of leadership — more inclusive, more European — failed to displace him from power.
Since 2021, this has been part of Bulgarian politics. But now another strong leader has emerged. In my view, this is the main reason for Radev’s strong result. The election campaign itself was not particularly vibrant or dynamic. It was not a campaign built around competing ideas or policy programmes. On the contrary, it was rather lackluster.
This shows that voter identification and emotional appeal played a key role.
There were also other factors. Much has been said about Generation Z, because it took part in the large-scale protests in December 2025. But in my view, the Bulgarian media discussion focused mainly on a few representatives of Generation Z who share a pro-European outlook.
At the same time, my research shows that Generation Z is among the age groups where some of the strongest pro-Russian and pro-Chinese attitudes are present, alongside older voters. In other words, there is a convergence between the youngest and the oldest voters.
We still need to see a detailed sociological breakdown. But already at this early stage, it appears that if Generation Z really did turn out in large numbers at the ballot boxes or voting machines, they most likely did not support the parties of change to any significant extent. They probably voted for Radev.
Obviously, Generation Z’s preference for the “strong leader” model also corresponds to the attitudes of a significant part of the broader population.
And finally, although these are still early results, the weak performance of pro-Russian parties such as Vazrazhdane, Velichie and even the Socialist Party suggests that Radev probably absorbed a considerable share of their support as well. I think pro-Russian voters see him as their representative.
So I would identify three factors. First, the “strong leader” model and the preference for it — this is absolutely key and represents a long-term trend. Second, Generation Z and its pro-Russian attitudes. And, of course, people were looking for something new. Although Radev is not actually a new politician, so I think that factor is less important.
— What explains the pro-Russian attitudes of Generation Z? And what was turnout like among this group of voters?
— There are many complex factors shaping the views of this generation. But part of it is linked to a very strong disenchantment with systemic parties. And this is not unique to Bulgaria; it can be seen in other countries as well.
What is specific to Bulgaria is that this generation grew up during the period when Bulgaria was already a member of the EU and NATO. They do not perceive the importance of that strategic choice as strongly. That is why they can be receptive to so-called alternatives.
In addition, Bulgaria’s educational system has essentially not changed. It still presents Russia as a liberator, a saviour, a Slavic brother. It lacks a critical approach. As a result, young people are still being socialised within the same framework of views.
As for turnout, we do not yet have final data. That is why I said we need to wait for a detailed sociological breakdown.
There were many claims that Generation Z would turn out in large numbers and change everything. If young people really did come out in large numbers, then clearly this did not help, let us say, the parties of change or Democratic Bulgaria.
Since the December protests, Bulgarian media, in my view, have covered this issue in a very one-sided and distorted way. They were not prepared to discuss the broader phenomenon of young people’s participation in politics and their real views. Instead, they focused on only a few individual cases.
But the broader mass appears to be different. This is also reflected in my research.
— What explains the poor performance of the pro-Russian party Vazrazhdane? Russia invested resources in supporting it for many years, including at the official level.
— This is indeed a very curious case.
For many years, I have, of course, followed the risks posed by Vazrazhdane’s positions. It is a radical party — or at least presents itself as a radical anti-systemic party. But it never managed to build enough support to become a leading political force. It was never seriously considered capable of governing the country or finishing in first place. It functioned as a spoiler, a disruptor within the system.
Now, for the first time, I would say, a figure has appeared in Bulgarian politics who can be perceived as both systemic and stable, even statesman-like, while at the same time remaining, at best, very vague on Bulgaria’s foreign policy orientation as part of the EU.
I think that throughout all this time Vazrazhdane was unable to break through a certain ceiling and become a party seriously viewed as a potential governing force. In addition, it was openly pro-Kremlin. And an anti-EU position was probably too difficult to sell to Bulgarian society. Bulgarians do not want to take such radical steps — for example, to leave an organisation of which they are already a part.
In other words, they do not want radical moves. We still have to see how everything develops. But over the last 35–36 years, as the example of parties such as GERB shows, they have declared a Euro-Atlantic orientation while at the same time remaining pro-Russian in business ties across various sectors and maintaining close relations with Russia. Yet they never openly challenged Bulgaria’s overall strategic course.
— In 2016, when Radev was first elected president, there were many investigations into Russian interference in that process, including by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. Were there any facts or signs of Russian interference this time?
— That, of course, could have been the case. And perhaps some findings will emerge in the near future. But I would stress that the problem is that there are genuine pro-Russian attitudes in Bulgaria. These are very easy to exploit.
In a hypothetical interference campaign, it would not be difficult to achieve success. That is why in my research I have always regarded Bulgarian public attitudes toward Russia as the most problematic sphere.
Dependence on Russian military equipment and energy resources has, of course, declined since the start of the full-scale invasion. We are no longer anywhere near the same level of Russian military and energy influence as before.
But public attitudes have not changed. And that is the problem. That is why political access can still be gained even without the former levers of influence. This is the main problem — whether there is overt Russian interference or not.
— Many people fear that Rumen Radev could become the next Viktor Orbán in terms of his policy toward Ukraine. Are there real grounds for that concern, or is the threat somewhat exaggerated?
— On the one hand, Orbán is a very specific phenomenon, especially in his willingness to openly confront European partners. That has never really been replicated in Bulgaria.
For example, Bulgaria has never behaved in that way, even when it had pro-Russian sympathies and elements of pro-Russian policy. Bulgaria has always been much more discreet in its pro-Russian positioning.
It has never acted the way Orbán has. That is, incidentally, a national specificity: an attempt to balance, not to come into open conflict with partners when that may be disadvantageous, while at the same time maintaining relations with others.
We still have to see where this may lead in relation to Ukraine. We can examine the record of Radev’s caretaker governments in 2022 and 2023. I do not think they were positively disposed toward weapons supplies, at least in rhetorical terms.
Moreover, his party very recently condemned the current caretaker government’s conclusion of a 10-year agreement with Ukraine on military assistance. So I think it is quite certain that policy toward Ukraine will not be as friendly or supportive.
This is also linked to the preferences of the electorate. They may try to follow those sentiments. But we shall see. It is still too early to say.
When parties actually come to power, they often change course and become less radical — as happened, for example, with Meloni in Italy. It is one thing to be a challenger and quite another to be the incumbent. But for now, it is too early to draw final conclusions.
Guildhall, exclusive.
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