Dutch threat perception has flipped since 2014 and especially 2022: Russia is now seen as a danger to Europe’s security. Hybrid pressure is murkier – bans on RT/Sputnik blunted overt propaganda, yet Moscow still “adds fuel” to domestic fires on issues like immigration, aiming to drain resources and attention. Drone incidents exposed readiness gaps and spurred spending, while public resistance lingers on measures such as army registration.
The prudent course is autonomy and resolve: Europe should grow more independent in defence and security while NATO’s deterrent keeps a full invasion unlikely, pushing Russia to operate below the threshold. Priorities are clear – diplomacy, awareness, capabilities – with a Ukrainian victory essential to prevent future aggression. Durable peace likely also requires change inside Russia and a rethink of global governance beyond a paralyzed UN Security Council.
This was stated in a lengthy interview with the Guildhall News Agency by a doctoral researcher at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) at Leiden University and an expert in security studies Sophie Vériter.
– Do people in the Netherlands perceive Russia as a danger to themselves and to the country?
– I think the answer to that has changed a lot over time. If you had asked me ten years ago, the answer would probably have been “no, the Dutch public doesn’t perceive Russia as a threat.” But since the annexation of Crimea and then the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that has changed dramatically. With those two events, the perception of a threat from Russia has increased for Europe as a whole – though not necessarily as a direct, personal threat to the Dutch. People don’t see themselves as the immediate target, but they do understand there’s something at stake for Europe.
– After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia increased its hybrid operations in Europe. Do you see such an escalation toward Europe, the West, and NATO?
– Because there is a lot of uncertainty about who is doing what and with what purpose, it’s difficult to measure whether there’s an increase. My hunch is that there is. My personal view is one thing, but I don’t think it represents what the average Dutch person feels. For many Dutch people, there isn’t a clear sense of increased hybrid warfare, for a few reasons. First, the EU and the Baltic states have worked to diminish the platforms previously used for propaganda – RT, Sputnik, and others are banned in the EU. Content still finds its way through new or other outlets, so it isn’t 100% airtight, but I think those measures shielded the Dutch public from something that might otherwise have been much bigger. Second, there are domestic debates – immigration, Euroscepticism, etc. – and I’m not sure the public sees the underlying factor that Russia may be trying to amplify those divides. I’m not saying the immigration issue is created by Russian propaganda; rather, fuel is being poured on an internally started fire. I’m not sure the Dutch public is fully aware of that yet.
– Your personal opinion is also important for us.
– It’s very hard to quantify how much of current divides – say, around immigration, which is a big topic in the Netherlands – are fueled by Russia versus originating domestically. Scientifically, you can’t credibly say “this is a 60% increase due to Russian propaganda.” So I won’t put a number on it. Still, looking at history and other countries – Hungary, the Baltic states – you see many similarities. If I were a Russian propagandist, I would obviously try to influence Dutch politics and debates on those topics. So even without definitive proof, my hunch is that yes, there are still a lot of hybrid-warfare activities happening. From my perspective, it’s more debated. I genuinely think internal failures fuel disputes that Russia then capitalizes on – seizing the opportunity. They see a fire starting and add oil, but the fire started inside. That matters, because the solution isn’t only to stop the person adding fuel; it’s to prevent the fire from starting. That requires acknowledging where Europe has fallen short: recognizing Ukraine’s strategic importance for European stability, our capacity to provide defense support, and how we’ve nourished our public sphere and democracy. The current dissatisfaction shows we haven’t done that well enough. We must acknowledge both elements.
– It’s not only information operations—there are drones, underwater cables cuts in the Baltic Sea, and other acts. What are the goals in such cases?
– I can’t read the minds of the operatives, so anything specific would be speculation. What I can say is about the effects inside Europe: greater awareness of our lack of security preparedness. It’s telling that drone incidents began and we weren’t ready; suddenly there were programs – drone defense, walls, and so on – which, as far as I know, aren’t yet proven effective. Media attention also grows because these incidents create fear and sensation. This all drives more investment in security and defense so you get a kind of “perfect storm” for increased attention and spending. I’m not sure that extends equally to the general public, though. There’s real resistance to measures like army registration. Attitudes can change fast after big events, but so far, I don’t think the public fully grasps the scope of these threats.
– These methods are often old KGB “active measures,” putting fuel on existing fires. Are there any new methods you or Dutch services are seeing?
– There’s still uncertainty – the fog of war. We’ve seen many cybersecurity incidents and electrical-grid malfunctions that could have been attacks – or simple failures. If it were an attack, companies would have little incentive to admit their security failed. So uncertainty remains. Still, such attacks are entirely possible and part of the hybrid arsenal used in the past by the KGB, so it wouldn’t surprise me.
– Do you see specific operations against NATO – aimed at dividing allies or undermining readiness?
– Nothing specific comes to mind immediately; I haven’t been focused on attacks aimed at NATO as such. What I do see is renewed questioning of the EU-NATO relationship because of the transatlantic dynamic, particularly under Trump. France has long argued for European strategic autonomy – Europe becoming more sovereign with its own security and defense capacity. That’s resurfacing now because the U.S. has proven unreliable. This could be linked to Russian activity– a fire that hybrid warfare then fuels – but it also exists on its own. My personal view: Europe should be more independent in defense and security.
– Russia also funds far-right and far-left actors and exploits the migration issue. Do you share concerns about possible radicalization in Europe?
– We’ve seen them do this elsewhere – Ukraine during Maidan, for example. It wouldn’t surprise me if they fueled violent extremism in the Netherlands. Whether I fear the consequences is another question. The Netherlands has a unique, consociational democracy; consensus-seeking politics make it hard for one party or idea to take over. So it’s harder to hijack the system in a truly dangerous way. Also, Dutch officials have had a wake-up call about Russia’s attempts to influence domestic politics, and I trust their capacity to manage it.
– What about a conventional military danger from Russia to Europe and to Netherlands?
– That’s less likely because NATO, as probably the best alliance we have, still holds. Invading a NATO country would be a very dangerous, bold move for Russia. Strategically, it makes more sense for them to stick to hybrid warfare below the threshold: it’s cheaper, often goes unnoticed and unpunished, and can still achieve results with less responsibility and accountability. That’s why I think a traditional invasion like in Ukraine is an unlikely scenario for an EU country.
– In 2022 many thought invasion was irrational but it happened. Russia may want to push further – Baltics, Finland, Poland. How can Europe and the West make this danger impossible – block invasions and hybrid interference?
– This hinges on broader geopolitics. Before 2022 there was insufficient pushback: China said nothing, the U.S. barely said anything, Europe was passive – so invasion became more likely. We can’t rule out an invasion of EU territory in the future, but for that to happen they’d need clear backing from other great powers like China, which is unlikely given Beijing’s carefully neutral posture. Things can change fast, though. To avoid such scenarios: multilateral diplomacy, strong relations among great powers, and sustained dialogue – so there’s no incentive to support bold aggression. Then the other two pillars we discussed: awareness and capabilities. In three words: diplomacy, awareness, capabilities. Awareness is often underestimated, but it drives political will for defense spending. Leaders ultimately respond to voters, so public understanding matters.
– In Ukraine we believe there are only two ways to avoid future Russian danger: a Ukrainian victory that destroys or significantly degrades Russia’s army here, and a change of regime in Russia – not just replacing Putin. What do you think?
– I agree: there must be a Ukrainian victory. Peace and justice must go together. A regime change in Russia also seems necessary for long-term peace; the question is how. We’re at the edge of big global changes – technological and political. There’s an opportunity to create new, functional global governance, because the current system – UN Security Council with Russia’s veto – has failed to prevent such wars. Rethinking global governance will take time, but history shows moments of great progress often follow moments of great crisis. I choose to focus on the opportunity to rebuild something better.
– That’s all from us. Thank you very much for your position and your work.
– It’s been a pleasure. Bye.
Exclusively, Guildhall.
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