Anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland poses a threat to Poland’s national interests, while the discourse surrounding Volhynia and Ukrainian nationalism largely repeats the framework of Russian propaganda. At the same time, Warsaw’s strategic interest remains Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO as soon as possible.
Polish expert Kazimierz Wóycicki said this in an interview with Guildhall.
Нow do you assess the current state of Ukrainian-Polish relations, what are the main strategic disagreements today, and how could we resolve these problems?
Unfortunately, as you know, there is currently an anti-Ukrainian wave in Poland, provoked by Nawrocki. The fact that he took away Zelenskyy’s order became a certain signal for all anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland.
There is also a response from the government to this wave in several areas. First of all, from the prosecutors, in order to react more quickly to the incidents that have taken place.
And Nawrocki himself, one could say, spoke in a different tone during Ukraine’s Independence Day.
But unfortunately, as you know, Tusk’s policy is absolutely pro-Ukrainian. However, opinion polls show that such a high level of support for Ukraine as there was before unfortunately no longer exists.
There is also a part of Polish society that is indifferent or negatively disposed toward Ukraine. I would say that approximately one third is negatively disposed.
The majority is not anti-Ukrainian, although it is not a very large majority. And pro-Ukrainian protests have taken place in many cities in Polish society.
On Ukraine’s Independence Day, we also had an important rally in Warsaw. In this sense, I would say that it is difficult to say that relations are good, but I would not want to say that everything is only bad. Relations have become more complicated than they were before.
On the Polish side, there is still a constant focus on historical relations. This is also beneficial for right-wing forces in Poland and is an element of domestic politics, as if the election campaign had already begun.
And this will continue to be used as an element of politics. But I think there is still a long way to go until autumn and the campaign itself.
What should be done?
First of all, I think this mobilisation of Polish society, these pro-Ukrainian demonstrations, are very important. It is important that there is protest. There was an anti-Ukrainian wave, but there is also very strong opposition to it.
And it is important to understand that support for Ukraine is not some kind of noble gesture. It is also one hundred percent in Poland’s interests. Such an understanding exists.
Humanitarian assistance is still continuing in society and so on. On the other hand, it would be good if there were more substantive discussions about these relations: about economic relations, about connecting Polish and Ukrainian infrastructure.
Because constantly talking only about Volhynia 80 years after the war is simply foolish.
Especially since Poles and Ukrainians have a long shared history. There are various difficult issues in it, but there are also very interesting questions, very interesting for Europe.
And we do not talk about this; we talk only about Volhynia.
I would say that the discourse about Volhynia in Poland is, unfortunately, very similar to the Moscow framework: Volhynia means the UPA, the UPA means extremists, the UPA is popular in Ukraine, therefore Ukraine is a nationalist state. This is Putin’s discourse.
This Putin discourse, in a somewhat lighter version, one could say, also exists in Poland.
What should be done?
Polish citizens like me need to write and speak. But it would be very good if there were more Ukrainian activity.
I think: why is there no Ukrainian Institute in Warsaw? This would be very important. Such institutions are needed not only for cultural relations, but also for intellectual discussion and so on.
Because there is a lack of knowledge about Ukraine in Poland. There are many translations and so on, but there is no broader perspective: what is Ukraine?
It is an incredibly important state, but another issue is a deeper knowledge of its culture, its agency, and the current situation.
In Poland, there is a constant focus on the war, on the war all the time. But much less is said about Ukraine as a modern, very interesting cultural space.
And work is needed here from both sides.
Do you see attempts by Russia to use the historical conflict between our countries? And has Russia already gained any advantages from the situation we have now?
Unfortunately, absolutely yes.
Russia interferes not only in Polish-Ukrainian relations, but also in other relations in Europe. Wherever it can provoke or intensify some kind of conflict, it does so. That is their work.
This can be seen in Germany and probably also in France. I also see the pressure of this propaganda on the internet on Polish-German relations, not only on Polish-Ukrainian relations.
It seems to me that provoking chaos is a Russian strategy, one could say, their political doctrine.
It would be good if there were more international cooperation against this propaganda.
For example, I am thinking about Polish-Ukrainian structures that would jointly analyse all these Russian actions in Polish-Ukrainian relations: where there is a provocation, where there are fakes, and so on.
But I would say that one of Russia’s most important instruments, its weapon, is this kind of narrative for Polish society: that Ukraine is nationalist.
This is not true, because there are no nationalist parties in the Verkhovna Rada.
But all the time we hear: “nationalists,” “Bandera,” and so on. This continues.
Of course, it takes a long time to explain how this narrative was constructed. But this narrative is a Russian weapon, and we need to defend ourselves against it.
Perhaps the most important thing is to do this together.
Please tell me, what mechanisms, what means does Russia use to influence our relations? As far as I know, in the Czech Republic and other countries, for example, the Russian House operates, as well as other organisations that can be used to promote certain ideas.
Media, social networks. This is very intensive Moscow activity.
You know, for example, when I publish some pro-Ukrainian meme, I receive one or two thousand hateful messages — anti-Ukrainian ones and ones directed against me.
And this happens very quickly.
For everyone who publishes anything pro-Ukrainian, the reaction on the internet appears very quickly and is massive.
What common interests, in your opinion, should we now use to overcome this escalation of the conflict?
First of all, Poland’s interest is for Ukraine to become a member of the European Union and NATO as soon as possible.
Of course, this is a complicated process, but Polish support for this absolutely exists.
And all these slogans that “you will not enter the European Union with Bandera” are counterproductive. They are not only foolish, but also run counter to Polish interests.
What do we need?
We need a good discussion about the economy that is understandable to broad sections of society. Because in Poland there is a belief, a stereotype, that Ukraine is a very strong competitor.
But if it is a competitor, then the question arises: is it in Poland’s interest for Ukraine to enter the European Union quickly?
Of course, such scepticism exists. This is a lack of understanding of what the European Union is.
The European Union is a union of countries where the win-win principle operates.
This is constructive competition. But this scepticism exists in Poland.
And once again: discussions, discussions and discussions — as much as possible. The Polish public debate should be as broad as possible.
Some experts express the view that perhaps Europe could create some kind of international mechanism based on international institutions that would help countries resolve similar conflicts. What do you think about this?
I am not against third parties taking part and being able to help.
However, in principle, I think this is a matter for Ukrainians and Poles, people of goodwill on both sides.
Perhaps this sounds too academic, but I think that an intellectual framework is very important for Polish-Ukrainian relations.
And I think it is a paradox, but for three decades, more than three decades, we have not had an intellectual framework for Polish-Ukrainian relations.
And it is absolutely necessary.
You are going through a process of reconstructing your memory, your historical memory, your agency, and so on.
Our process is no less complicated, because Poland also needs a new narrative about itself.
These social processes in Poland are very dynamic. These are two countries, two societies that are, to a certain extent, searching for a new identity for themselves.
And perhaps this is why the processes in our relations are so complicated.
But, on the other hand, there is xenophobia in Poland, and this anti-Ukrainian sentiment is a threat to Polish interests.
Fortunately, Nawrocki’s latest speech on the occasion of the Ukrainian holiday was normal. But what he did before was terrible.
As a Polish citizen, I am even ashamed that the Polish president can behave like that.
Thank you very much for this conversation.
Oleksandra Radkevych, Guildhall News Agency, exclusive.
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