Neil Shastri-Hurst: The West needs to demonstrate strength to Russia to achieve peace

The West needs to demonstrate strength to Russia in order to achieve a sustainable and just peace. To do this, first and foremost, it is necessary to continue arms supplies so that Ukraine can defend itself effectively. This includes strengthening air defense systems, providing long-range missiles, and conducting training programs. In addition, Western countries need to significantly expand and tighten their sanctions policy against Russia. It is necessary to discuss the possibility of using not only the interest but also the principal amount of frozen Russian assets, to intensify the application of secondary sanctions against third countries, and to increase pressure through sanctions on the Kremlin’s inner circle.

Another important issue concerns the war crimes committed by Russia in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine — such as the deportation of Ukrainian children followed by indoctrination, filtration camps, forced Russification, compulsory passportization, and so on — which deserve condemnation and require an immediate response from the international community aimed at ending such practices. The UK Parliament has already taken a number of steps in this direction.

This was stated in a detailed interview with the news agency Guildhall by Neil Shastri-Hurst, a member of the UK Parliament.

Mr. Shastri-Hurst, we see that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe have all expressed willingness to establish a ceasefire for at least 30 days. However, against the backdrop of these initiatives, we also observe that Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare — aimed both against Ukraine and Europe as a whole — are only intensifying. In your opinion, what should be the appropriate and balanced response of European countries, and more broadly of the entire West, to Russia’s ongoing escalation?

Neil Shastri-Hurst: That’s a very good question. We need to be clear and decisive in our response. Both Ukraine and the United States have signaled a willingness to engage in peace talks, but those talks cannot happen while Russia continues to hold a proverbial gun to Ukraine’s head. As you rightly pointed out, Russia has escalated its aggression — more missile strikes, more disinformation, and further attempts to destabilise the region and divide the Western alliance.

So what should we be doing to support Ukraine? We must continue supplying weapons to help Ukraine defend itself — not just to hold the line, but to reclaim the territory lost since the start of the invasion. That includes strengthening air defences, providing long-range missiles, and expanding training support. Training, in particular, is crucial. But equally important is investing in air deterrence capabilities — not only for Ukraine, but for the NATO alliance as a whole.

One clear message coming from across the Atlantic is that European partners need to step up. We must reinforce NATO’s eastern flank, improve Europe’s cyber resilience, and develop stronger responses to hybrid threats — whether it’s disinformation campaigns or energy blackmail. And we need a coordinated, strategic approach to all of it. Above all, any peace that’s reached must be a just peace — one that respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because if we reward Russian aggression, we risk setting a dangerous precedent — not just for Putin and the Kremlin, but for other authoritarian regimes around the world, whether in China, Iran, or North Korea, who are watching the West’s response extremely closely.

How do you think the phrase «peace through strength» should be understood? This expression is often heard in public and expert discussions, especially in the context of the current international crisis. But what, in your view, really lies behind this term? What are its key elements and potential risks?

Neil Shastri-Hurst:

It shows robustness. It demonstrates, not just to Putin and the Kremlin, but to the wider world, that we cannot be held to ransom. Any future peace must be a just peace. It must be on Ukraine’s terms. Any decision over sovereignty must be made by Ukraine alone, not under pressure from partners or other forces. This also involves not only reparations but the certainty that those Russians responsible for war crimes — and there is strong evidence — are prosecuted. If we fail to do that, if we lack resolve, we know Putin will return. He feeds on perceived weakness. That is why there must be strength — not only from the Ukrainian people but also from their allies — to show we are resolute against any further aggression.

I would like to touch on another aspect of our peace negotiations. You know, only the Ukrainian president consistently talks about the need to bring our people, our children, back home to Ukraine. But we hardly ever hear about this from Trump, and even less so from Putin. Don’t you think this is one of the key issues that deserves more attention and louder discussion? For us Ukrainians, it’s not about territories. When we say we refuse to retreat, it’s not about land—it’s about the people who live there. We want our citizens to be safe, to survive. Because we know very well what is happening to Ukrainians in the occupied territories. So maybe the international conversation should shift focus—not so much on territories, but on the people living there?

Neil Shastri-Hurst: Ultimately, this is fundamentally about people. It’s about national identity — about where people consider home. We have seen not only displacement but the dreadful, utterly egregious cases of children taken to Russia and indoctrinated. These are malign acts by Putin and those who work for and with him, and they must be called out. We’ve done so in the UK Parliament. We are fully aware of what has been happening — the deep distress it causes and the enormous outrage it provokes. We must name it for what it is. This is a tactic Putin has used repeatedly. Only by speaking out can we raise awareness and ensure the world understands the egregious nature of this individual.

Thank you for sharing your position. Now, let’s talk about money. Oil remains the main source of revenue for the Russian state budget. In early March, prices for Russian Urals crude hovered around $56 per barrel, but now, after the general decline in global market prices, Russian oil is selling for about $50 per barrel. Nevertheless, even at this price level, Russia continues to generate profits that allow it to finance its military machine and aggression. Some experts suggest that the West might consider revising the price cap on Russian oil and lowering it further — for example, down to $40–50 per barrel. This could make it harder to circumvent sanctions and significantly reduce the Kremlin’s military budget. Do you believe that lowering the price cap could indeed increase pressure on Moscow?

Neil Shastri-Hurst: Well, I think the price cap imposed by the G7 was actually quite a clever move. It kept global markets stable at the time while curbing the Kremlin’s profiteering. But we have to face reality — Russia has adapted, as it tends to do. The discount on crude oil is narrowing significantly. I think last month it was just under the $60 cap.

What we can’t do is allow sanctions to erode through inactivity. There is a very strong case for lowering that cap. It would make the circumvention of sanctions harder. It would force Russia to sell at an even deeper discount or rely more heavily on its shadow fleet, which is both costly and vulnerable. The key is to remember that sanctions should never be considered static. They require constant updating and enforcement, because alongside military attrition, there is economic attrition. If we’re complacent — and I’ll be very blunt — time isn’t on our side. We need to act now. This must be part of a wider group of sanctions, some of which we’ve already touched on today.

If I can expand on that: there’s a growing case for using not just the interest, but also the principal of frozen Russian assets. There’s a strong legal argument for it. The traditional distinction over who owns the interest versus the principal doesn’t exist within international banking law. We need to test and flex that.

We also need to look at secondary sanctions. The Russian war economy is being sustained by third nations. We must apply more pressure to stop them from enabling this. Enforcement is critical. Too often, sanctions are announced with fanfare but not followed through. We need better coordination, tighter export controls, and digital tracking of sensitive goods.

And the third point: we need to tighten sanctions around the Kremlin’s inner circle. That means not just political figures, but also those who fund them — the business leaders enabling the war machine. But we can only do that if we act as a unified force. Sanctions don’t work in isolation or fragmentation. But when we act in a coordinated, consistent, and comprehensive way, the power of sanctions can be incredibly effective.

International maritime law today makes it difficult for us to effectively counter the «shadow fleet». We see how challenging it is to restrict the movement of these tankers. However, beyond the fact that the «shadow fleet» enables the circumvention of international sanctions and, consequently, fills the Russian budget, it also poses a serious environmental threat — especially for the countries of the Baltic Sea. Perhaps the European Union could use this environmental threat as both an argument and a legal basis to restrict the navigation of such vessels?

Neil Shastri-Hurst: Well, I think the shadow fleet is a major concern. There are two specific issues you’ve touched upon. Firstly, they enable Russia to keep selling oil at higher prices, which feeds their wartime economy. Secondly, the environmental risks are serious. These are old-fashioned, uninsured tankers, poorly maintained, often operating in very sensitive maritime zones — whether the Baltic or the Arctic. The risk of a major oil spill from these frankly unseaworthy vessels is not hypothetical; it’s a question of when, not if. Both European nations, and the UK no longer in the EU, have environmental regulations that can be powerful levers here. We can deny access to ports, penalise companies servicing these ships, and raise diplomatic pressure on states.

It’s about combining our climate values with strategic objectives. Combating this in that way is both smart and a high-ground approach to delivering results. I hope you can use environmental law, which is very strong, to restrict shadow fleet vessels from navigating or selling oil in areas like the Baltic Sea. This is an important topic. The reality is we must use every instrument and mechanism available to combat this activity. That requires agile, flexible thinking and working in unison with partners to ensure a joined-up approach.

I want to raise another very important topic — the activities of the Russian state corporation Rosatom. As you know, this company builds nuclear power plants on European soil. However, its subsidiaries are involved in manufacturing components for military equipment — including missile systems and other weapons. We have evidence that Rosatom not only produces military-grade products but also plays a significant role in financing the Russian budget. Moreover, it serves as a tool of leverage against European countries, since behind the facade of «civilian» nuclear energy lie direct ties to the military-industrial complex. Nevertheless, as we see, international sanctions against Rosatom remain limited and fragmented. In your opinion, shouldn’t the European Union increase its sanction pressure on Rosatom? What do you think is the reason that sanctions so far have not been sufficiently strict and comprehensive?

Neil Shastri-Hurst: Yeah, I think it’s a glaring gap in our sanctions architecture. We’re talking about an organisation presenting itself as a civil nuclear firm, when in reality, almost half its output supports the Russian defence sector. You touched on some of the equipment it’s involved in building through its subsidiaries — whether cruise missiles, EWS systems, or multiple launch rocket systems. They have their fingerprints on a wide range of defence equipment. In that sense, they are very much part of the Russian military-industrial complex.

The sanctions in place now are patchy. What we need is a more coordinated, comprehensive approach — one that targets defence-linked subsidiaries while managing legitimate civil nuclear dependencies that some countries have. But we must be serious about this. If we truly want to cut off Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort, we can’t leave them out of the equation, because they are a fundamental part of it. We must continue dialogue and focus on their significance as a war enabler for Russia. They are very much in mind during G7 discussions on how to support Ukraine both in the present conflict and in the long-term resolution.

My final question concerns the current relationship between the United States and the European Union. The United Kingdom, even after Brexit, remains an important part of the European community. Europe, the UK, and the US have always been key partners in the democratic coalition. However, now — against the backdrop of President Trump’s policies — the relationship between these major players has become rather strained, and no one can say for sure where it’s headed. In your view, what role should the European Union and the United Kingdom — despite its formal exit from the EU — play in preserving Western unity in the face of authoritarian regimes?

Neil Shastri-Hurst: Well, I’ll take that question as about the European Union and the UK, and about Europe in broader terms, and its relationship with the United States. I think that bond is the cornerstone of the democratic world. The UK plays an important bridging role in that. This relationship isn’t just historic; it’s a living relationship, evolved through politics and leadership, and it will stand the test of time.

One thing that has come out of the changing geopolitical landscape and the changing US administration is a sense of urgency in Europe and among NATO partners to step up defence spending. This isn’t about any one nation going alone; it’s about all of us carrying more weight and investing more in defence. It’s also about taking energy security seriously and developing a strategic policy that reinforces, not dilutes, our shared values. The takeaway is that having strategic autonomy as a nation doesn’t mean strategic detachment. The European voice within NATO matters — not just here or in Europe, but across the pond in Washington, and importantly, in Kyiv and beyond. How we respond and show that democracies stand together and act decisively when required is important.

We must show that unity is maintained, that sanctions are enforced, and demonstrate as a group of nations working together that our support for Ukraine is enduring — not just until the war ends, but until just peace is secured.

Hanna Soloviova, Guildhall News Agency, exclusive.

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