To achieve peace through, the EU must use everything that contributes to preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this context, the problem should not be reduced to a single issue — there are many areas where action is needed. Military support, especially the supply of defense equipment, is of the greatest importance now. And here the integration of the Ukrainian defense industry with the European one can play a leading role. This direction becomes especially important against the background of the current state of the European defense industry, which leaves much to be desired. The EU countries should not develop separately — on the contrary, coordination of efforts and joint strengthening of defense potential is required.
Ivars Ijabs, a member of the European Parliament from Latvia (Renew), told the Guildhall news agency in an exclusive interview.
Mr Ijabs, although both the United States and Ukraine have expressed readiness to engage in negotiations aimed at resolving Russia’s war against Ukraine, we continue to witness a growing escalation of Russian military aggression and hybrid warfare targeting both Ukraine and the broader West. In your view, what should be the appropriate response from the West to these ongoing actions by Russia?
Mr Ivars Ijabs: Well, first of all, generally speaking, the most appropriate response is that all that can help Ukraine to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. And in that sense, I think this is not just about one single issue that should be solved, but there are multiple fronts or multiple issues that could be dealt with. First of all, I think that military support, especially defense materials, is of crucial importance right now.
That’s why we are very hopeful regarding the incoming German government, as Friedrich Merz talks about the abilities of Taurus. Because let’s be frank, even if there is some result of those peace talks, of which I am rather skeptical of, but nevertheless, there might be some kind of a solution moderated by the Americans and so on and so forth. Even then, Ukraine and Europe will need a lot of deterrence. And this deterrence can’t be just some kind of a paper security guarantee. That should be really a strong line of defense in Ukraine supported by the EU. And well there are many issues we have been dealing with also here in the European Parliament.
For example, we adopted legislation where I was also one of the rapporteurs EDIP (the European Defense Industrial Program). There is a separate part for how we integrate your defense industrial complex with the European, because yo know that Europe is also in a rather shabby state right now regarding our defense materials and defense industry. And this is where Ukraine comes into play, because we shouldn’t be doing that separately. Europe should just promote integration.
As for hybrid threats, as a Latvian citizen, I understand Ukrainian reality all too well. For instance, we continue to face serious problems with disinformation, particularly from Russian propaganda outlets. We’re talking about sanctioned entities—those very media channels that push neo-imperialist rhetoric, attempt to justify aggression, and manipulate public opinion. Formally, they are on the sanctions list. Their broadcasting is supposedly banned across the European Union. But in practice, the reality is different. These materials remain accessible—for example, on YouTube—in Latvia and in other EU countries. This is a vivid example of how disinformation continues to penetrate the digital space despite formal restrictions. As a result, we are dealing not only with sanctions policy, but also with regulatory challenges in the digital sphere. We must acknowledge this honestly: disinformation channels are still operating and Russia, unfortunately, also promoting a lot of its aggressive agenda in Europe. There are multiple issues. We can also talk about sanctions and issues like that. But the general approach is that we have to help Ukraine to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Thank you for your position. Next, I would like to talk about the revenues of the Russian budget. Oil remains the primary source of revenue for the Russian state budget. We are seeing a narrowing of the discount on Urals crude oil, with prices in early March fluctuating between $56 and $56.9 per barrel — just below the current price cap. This allows Russia to continue generating profits and financing its military aggression. What is your view on the idea of lowering the price cap on Russian oil in order to make sanctions circumvention more difficult and significantly reduce the Kremlin’s war budget?
Mr Ivars Ijabs: Well, I think this is part of the story. This can be just a single element, but it is part of the larger story. You might know that in January of this year, there were seven EU countries, including Latvia, which asked for lowering the price cap. What has been achieved with this policy? This is a mixed story: the EU in general has significantly decreased our dependence on Russian oil and gas, despite the fact that there is still a lot of work to do, especially regarding oil and regarding LNG.
As for the price cap, it should be made lower because right now I think that the current prices are around 60 US dollars per barrel anyway, meaning that Russia is not suffering from that very much. But the problem is that Russians are selling the oil, not to Europe in such a large extent, but they are selling it elsewhere. And this is where the story about the shadow fleet comes in. To my mind, lowering the cap is also important. Well, in that aspect, I would say, well, Trump’s tariff policies are kind of a mixed blessing. What’s happening right now, the oil prices are falling. Let’s see what the OPEC+ is going to do in the coming days.
And of course, Russian production cost is rather high, meaning that those remittances to the Russian state budget are going to decrease. But again, to what an extent, because Russians are selling the oil for cheap, for example, to India and places like that, which still provides them with substantial revenue. I would say that price cap is an issue. It should be made lower, but it won’t much help if we just don’t do anything with the shadow fleet.
That was one of my key questions. After all, the so-called shadow fleet not only enables Russia to circumvent sanctions and maintain its revenue streams, but it also poses a serious environmental threat to the countries of the Baltic region. We are already seeing active steps from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in their efforts to restrict or at least monitor the navigation of these vessels. Because, to speak frankly, any incident involving such a tanker could result in a real disaster — both for the marine ecosystem and for the coastal states. Can the European Union, by referring to the potential environmental risks, use international maritime law to restrict these vessels?
Mr Ivars Ijabs: You are absolutely right — this is not only about the trade in sanctioned Russian oil. The environmental threat you mentioned is indeed very serious, but it is only part of the problem. There are other important aspects as well, such as security concerns. We know that vessels registered in offshore zones or countries with minimal oversight can potentially be used for acts of sabotage, particularly targeting underwater infrastructure — such as internet cables, gas pipelines, or electrical transmission lines. This already falls into the category of national security for the entire region.
From a legal standpoint, unfortunately, the European Union is still acting too formally. Yes, maritime law does indeed restrict our actions, but even within its framework, there are exceptions. For example, if a vessel poses a potential threat to the environment or national security, states have legal grounds to inspect, stop, or even detain it. Some countries have already begun to take action. For instance, our neighbors — Finland and Estonia — are undertaking concrete steps in this direction. I believe such measures should be extended to the entire Baltic coastline, including Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, in order to limit the movement of such tankers through the region.
In addition, there is another important dimension. My colleagues and I have sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Greece. The fact is, a significant portion of the so-called shadow fleet vessels, according to available data, were previously owned by Greek shipping companies. Out of roughly 75–80 vessels currently under U.S. sanctions, about a third previously belonged to Greece. And Greece is an EU member. This raises questions. We must act together, and that’s why we hope Athens will show greater responsibility in this matter. And it’s not only about selling ships — it’s also about ship-to-ship oil transfers in open waters — without proper oversight and often in violation of technical standards. These vessels are often in extremely poor condition, and a possible accident could lead to an environmental disaster, especially in enclosed waters like the Baltic Sea.
In fact, some Baltic countries have already taken concrete steps — for example, Estonia and Finland have detained vessels from the so-called shadow fleet. This is particularly important considering that the Gulf of Finland leads directly to Saint Petersburg and is of critical geopolitical significance. However, it’s important to understand that decisions about, say, closing straits — such as the Danish Straits — fall under the jurisdiction of national governments, in this case, Denmark. Nevertheless, the European Commission and the EU as a whole must support such decisions if the Danish government deems the situation genuinely threatening. This must be a joint effort, based on solidarity and a strategic approach.
Unfortunately, at the EU level, we often encounter an excessively formalistic approach to this issue — too much depends on legal nuances. Meanwhile, as you rightly pointed out, the Baltic Sea is vulnerable in two key respects. First, from an environmental point of view — it is a relatively shallow and enclosed body of water, and any accident could have catastrophic consequences. Second, from a technological standpoint — critical communication and energy cables lie on the seabed, making the region highly sensitive to potential sabotage. When Finland and Sweden joined NATO, this sparked a wave of optimism in the Baltic states — that now the Baltic Sea had become an internal sea of the Alliance. However, as we see, the reality is far more complex. NATO membership alone does not solve the problems of navigation, security, and sanctions enforcement. What’s needed here is not only political will but also close intergovernmental cooperation — including within the EU.
I would like to raise another extremely important issue that should be at the core of all European security policy. The activities of the Russian state corporation Rosatom have gone beyond the realm of purely civilian nuclear energy. According to independent researches, Rosatom and its subsidiaries are directly involved in Russia’s defense-industrial complex — from development to production of components for missiles and military technologies. Despite this, the current sanctions remains fragmented and insufficient. In your opinion, should the EU strengthen sanctions against Rosatom?
Mr Ivars Ijabs: Well, you are right in the sense that we should have that situation under control and right now, I mean, times are changing in many ways. Europe is turning back to nuclear energy in general, because let’s say five years ago, there’s the Green Deal with its policies. There was this idea that everyone should follow the German example and just get rid of nuclear power. Right now, nuclear is back.
And of course, this means that we should really think about the future of nuclear energy without being dependent on Russia and without supporting the Russian military-industrial complex where Rosatom is a part of. And in that sense, my approach is to think about, first of all, substitutes. I’m not an expert in nuclear energy, but as far as I understand, this is not right that there is something absolutely indispensable in what Rosatom is producing. There are certain elements or certain processes, for example, enrichment and things like that, where they are pretty advanced, but they can be substituted from elsewhere. For example, buying nuclear materials from Canada or in the worst case, buying them even from Kazakhstan, but not buying them from Russia. And in that sense, there are solutions.
I think these are four countries — Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Czech Republic which have all those soviet-style nuclear power plants that still very much depend on Russian fuel, which can be substituted, and the EU should help them do that. On the other hand, we see Hungary, which is just building a new one with Rosatom, which is an outrage. And Orbán and Fidesz are clearly acting as Putin’s Trojan horse in the European Union. Right now the problem is that they are not alone, but nevertheless, they are the most prominent ones.
And this is really an outrage, because just as you said, first of all, Rosatom is not some kind of a nice civilian organization. It is producing a lot of war materials. And secondly, this can be used in the future also as a leverage. If we make ourselves dependent on companies that support the work of these nuclear power plants, then they also can blackmail the European countries a lot, especially with the high energy prices. Europe is really suffering from the high energy prices. And the question is where we can get substitutes. And nuclear in itself is regarded as a very viable substitute on the condition that we don’t make ourselves dependent on Russia. Everyone is waiting for small modular reactors (SMR). But it is 10 years at least until we get to them. As far as I understand, there are something like 99 nuclear power plants in the EU and 19, which is almost a fifth are still dependent on Rosatom. This is a significant amount of our energy infrastructure.
Last week, I conducted several interviews with representatives of European countries. And it seemed to me that about half of your colleagues in the European Union expressed the view that there is growing discussion about invoking Article 7 — which provides for the suspension of a member state’s voting rights for failing to uphold European values — against Hungary, as the fatigue with its actions is becoming increasingly evident. Would you agree that this sentiment is gaining ground within the EU?
Mr Ivars Ijabs: Yes, especially when it comes to matters that require unanimity — for example, EU enlargement. Members of the Fidesz party, for instance, are blocking the start of accession talks with Ukraine. This directly affects your EU membership path. Formally, Ukraine is a candidate country, but there are about 150 decisions that require unanimous approval. Can you imagine that? So we’ll see what happens next. At the same time, I believe political obstacles can be overcome. I’m confident that a coalition of the willing could emerge in Europe. Another issue, of course, concerns money — because this is where member states, not just Hungary but all EU countries, have their own strong opinions on what’s needed and what’s not.
The current state of relations between the United States and the European Union — key partners in the democratic coalition—remains dynamic, shaped in large part by the policies of the White House. In your view, what role should the European Union play in maintaining Western unity in confronting authoritarian regimes?
Mr Ivars Ijabs: First of all, Europe must become more self-reliant in matters of security. For a long time, we delegated these issues to NATO and the United States. However, there are now signs that the situation is changing — and so are the decisions being made. The current composition of the European Parliament, for example, is much more realistic when it comes to matters of security and defense compared to its predecessors. But regarding the global situation and Europe’s role in it, I firmly believe in the necessity of Western unity. And by the West, I don’t just mean Europe and the United States, but also countries like Japan, South Korea, and others that share our values. This is not a matter of geography, but of civilizational choice. That is precisely why we particularly value Ukraine’s decision and its choice in favor of Europe and the West. We must steadfastly support Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity until full victory. And it is vital that we continue to cooperate closely with the United States in this process.
As for the current U.S. administration, I understand all the discussions and the criticism surrounding it. But I do not believe that the current American administration sees Europe as an enemy — that is simply not the case. However, several aspects should be taken into account. We must not perceive the United States as an extension of Europe. At times in the past, it has felt as though we did. There has always been a difference in how we, the old world — including Ukraine — perceive events, and how Americans view them. In the U.S., there is often an element of exceptionalism that influences their perception of global politics. It is a completely different society. Though America is also a free, democratic, liberal, and dynamic country, it is not the same as Europe. This difference is important to understand and take into account in our relationship.
Regarding the Trump administration, several things are quite clear. I’ve spoken to many American colleagues over the past months, and even during his first term, it was evident that Trump’s approach reflects certain deeply rooted American realities. Above all, he cannot stand free riders — those who benefit without contributing. That is a major issue for him. Of course, it’s worth acknowledging that the U.S. itself helped foster this practice in Europe in the past, but now they want to change that, and we must recognize this.
Another point is that Americans are not necessarily hostile, but rather skeptical toward the European project as we understand it. I’m referring to Brussels, the multinational institutions, and transnational structures like the European Commission. I remember Mike Pompeo, when he came to Brussels during Trump’s first presidency, openly questioning what kind of institution this was with unelected commissioners, and so on. This shows they are willing to work with individual European countries — for instance, Italy, the Baltic States, or Poland — but they are not particularly enthusiastic about cooperating with the EU as a whole, especially since they see it as an economic competitor, particularly in trade.
I believe that, in the end, we will reach some kind of modus vivendi with the United States. Of course, Trump is a flamboyant figure who enjoys being in the spotlight, and it was painful for me to watch his public clashes with President Zelensky. Nonetheless, I still hope that the American way of doing things will prevail — because the United States has always been more than just an economic or military superpower. It has always been a superpower of alliances. There will no doubt be turbulence ahead — related to China, to tariffs — but even so, I still believe that we will ultimately find common ground with the Americans, whatever happens.
Yes, you are right, Europe and the United States have historically been partners.
Mr Ivars Ijabs: Well, it depends on which historical period we’re talking about. It hasn’t always been that way. However, if the U.S. is looking for friends, most of their allies and friends are indeed in Europe. That said, of course, from Ukraine’s perspective, these general discussions don’t address the current situation. Talk of shared culture or civilizations doesn’t help resolve issues when Ukrainian soldiers and civilians are still dying because of Russian aggression, which hasn’t been stopped. I don’t think there is the slightest desire from the Russian side to achieve any long-term and stable peace, because there are very few signs that Putin has changed his stance on the goals of the war, which essentially consist of destroying Ukrainian statehood — something we must prevent at all costs.
Of course, there may be some diplomatic agreements and solutions, but we must listen to the Ukrainian leadership and people — what is acceptable to them and what is not. Because right now, I think Trump and his administration understand that trying to impose some, let’s say, questionable compromise on Ukraine will clearly lead to a backlash. And I just don’t understand why they’re doing it, especially when, for example, they discuss the international recognition of Crimea’s occupation. That said, I think that for Ukraine, a coordinated solution that is acceptable to the Ukrainian side would indeed be a desirable outcome. The question is whether we can all together stop the aggressor, because this is also a matter of deterrence. Here, Putin cannot be trusted, neither on paper nor in words. He can only be deterred, and I hope the West understands this.
Hanna Soloviova, Guildhall News Agency, exclusively.
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