And we don’t necessarily need to spend a lot of money on this because we can use the frozen Russian assets. And I am frustrated by the fact that this is not happening quickly enough. When I was in Ukraine in April 2024, even then these discussions were happening, and I was already trying to insist on fully utilizing all the frozen Russian assets and directly transferring them to Ukraine. That’s 300 billion euros. This could be a decisive factor because it’s more than everything that has been provided so far. So, we are talking about direct investments in the Ukrainian defense industry, secondly, about confiscating Russian assets and transferring them to Ukraine, and thirdly, about speeding up (military aid supplies to Ukraine — ed.), because we need to be faster.
The past year has clearly shown that Russia is not willing to go for a peaceful agreement. For example, the latest study by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is titled «The Components of Russia’s Unannounced War Against the West». Let me quote from it: «Russia’s unannounced war against the West is intensifying, using fear, destabilization, and covert operations to undermine NATO’s unity and the West’s resilience». Do you agree with this RUSI assessment that Russia is indeed waging an unannounced war against the West?
— I haven’t seen the report you’re referring to, but I believe it’s even more than an unannounced war because Putin has declared it, stating: «We are in a state of war with the West». So, this is more of an unannounced war from the European side. Russian aggression is absolutely evident, and it goes beyond Ukraine. I’ve seen many examples of their hostile actions, and this was one of the reasons that prompted me to give a speech in the European Parliament, where I asked my colleagues, «When will we wake up?»
We are seeing so many manifestations of hybrid warfare, so many cyberattacks and other hostile actions, and the number of these examples has significantly increased over the past few months. It’s time to act! The Dutch Minister of Defense said it like this: «We are not in a state of war, but we are also not in a state of peace». So, this is a kind of gray zone, which I think many European politicians see at the moment. But this Russian aggression is absolutely clear. And perhaps it’s even more than unannounced because they are declaring that they want to attack the West.
This is also one of the reasons I often tell Europeans that the money and weapons we are giving to Ukraine are not charity, but investments in our own security. It’s very important for people to realize this. Because some ask, «Why should we do this? We have other problems at home». The answer is because it is a direct investment in our own security. It is morally right, but it is also sensible.
I hope that all Western politicians will think the same way. You mentioned investments in the defense sector, so I want to talk a little more about the economy. We see that a key factor influencing Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine is the very high level of budget revenues from oil and gas sales. A significant portion of these revenues comes from Russia’s «shadow fleet». Are there any measures from Western countries to counteract the «shadow fleet»?
— Yes, it’s frustrating that this has been going on for so long. And now we are seeing that some Western and European countries are waking up and trying to take action. But we already knew about this 12 or 18 months ago. And only now are we seeing the first steps to prevent the «shadow fleet» from selling Russian oil and gas, and thus financing the war. Measures could include, for example, preventing tankers from entering ports, which they often do under different flags. If we ban all these ships from entering ports across Europe, it would significantly complicate their lives. There are other measures we can take. I think we know what needs to be done. The question is, can we speed up the process? And will we find the political will to do so? Because, unfortunately, we see that in Europe there are politicians and some governments who do not feel the need to support Ukraine as strongly as I do.
Let’s return to Russian oil and gas revenues. The well-known publication The Guardian reports that in 2024, the European Union purchased a record amount of LNG from Russia. I would like to hear your assessment of this situation. What should be done in this regard? Because we see that the European Union is still purchasing gas and oil from Russia.
— Really? The EU purchased a record amount of LNG from Russia?
Yes, that’s written in The Guardian article.
— That’s terrible, and it shouldn’t be happening. I know that Europe has invested significant funds into LNG terminals to be able to import more gas because we have been trying to reduce dependence on Russian gas, and the U.S. has a lot of liquefied gas that we are now importing as well. Although there are some issues in our relations with the United States, which you may be aware of, the LNG imports from the U.S. can help in this matter. It could not only be a good way to stop importing LNG from Russia, but it could also improve our relations with the United States.
We also need to think about climate change. This is another very important issue for us. So, the best way to ensure we no longer need LNG from Russia is to invest in renewable energy sources. In the coming weeks, I will organize an event in the European Parliament focused on how we can, through investments in renewable energy and swift actions on this front, both undermine Russia’s power and at the same time help fight climate change.
I don’t know how the European Union can change this situation, because then something needs to be done about India, and that seems impossible at the moment. So perhaps that’s why the LNG purchases are so high. And perhaps that’s why it’s more complicated than just saying we no longer want to buy oil or liquefied gas, because they go through these countries. But despite how difficult it is, it shouldn’t stop us from taking action in this direction.
Another question I’d like to ask. You’ve already mentioned that European banks hold 300 billion dollars in frozen Russian assets, which could be used, among other things, for military aid to Ukraine from the EU. But I want to ask about the situation in the EU’s defense industry. How do you assess the current dynamics of the defense industry and investments? You’ve mentioned the situation with the U.S., and I hear from many Western politicians that the European Union must be strong even without U.S. help. How do you assess the situation in the defense industry?
— Investments in defense are growing rapidly. We have a lot to work on. Let’s start with some positive examples. For the first time, the European Commission has appointed an EU Commissioner for Defense — Mr. Andrius Kubilius. He is competent and ambitious. He will come with a plan for what investments should look like. He suggests starting with a «big bang», meaning investing 100 billion euros into the European defense industry. So these are positive signs. However, I think all of this is happening too slowly. That’s why I am a big supporter of this «big bang» approach. But sometimes, when I participate in discussions about the European defense industry, I think: is this really May 2022? Because this conversation should have been initiated three months after the Russians launched their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, not three years later. At the same time, I understand that sometimes processes take time. And one of the reasons these processes are delayed is that the European Union is not capable of making decisions quickly.
We see that sometimes the interests of individual countries are prioritized over what is best for the European Union as a whole. Very often, it is the Hungarian government, and in some cases governments of other countries, that want to take all these investments for themselves. I think this narrow, nationalist mentality is very outdated. We live in 2025, not 1965. We need to stop thinking in Europe within the framework of these national states and start thinking about what is best for the EU as a whole. And then we can make these things happen more quickly. But unfortunately, that is not yet happening. That is why I will continue working in the European Parliament to make this happen as soon as possible and to speed up our actions. However, it is still happening too slowly. I think the saddest example of this is that we couldn’t fulfill our promise to Ukraine of delivering 1 million artillery shells within the promised time frame. This is something we need to change by speeding up investments in European defense industry.
But as I understand it, this can go two ways. For example, developing your own European industry and investing in Ukrainian defense industry. This could become a united European security effort.
— I believe that both of these processes must take place simultaneously. If we focus only on direct investments in Ukraine, we will not be able to build our own industry. And in the long term, this will be harmful to the entire European security architecture, including Ukraine. If we focus only on Europe, we will make the situation on the front lines more difficult for Ukraine. Therefore, we need to pursue both approaches at the same time.
I completely agree with you. That makes a lot of sense. Alright. Let’s talk about NATO countries’ reaction to Trump’s recent statements about Greenland, and the increased tariffs on Mexico and Canada. What is happening inside NATO?
— We are already seeing, for example, that Denmark is investing another 2 billion euros in Greenland. We also see that 85% of surveyed Greenland residents say they would prefer to be part of the EU rather than the United States. And the largest share of respondents actually want independence. Only a very small portion wants to be part of the United States. And of course, what is happening is madness — it’s absurd. The way Trump treats all the values and rules that the United States once defended, as if they no longer matter at all, is simply offensive. The people of Denmark also supported the United States in several wars over the past decades, and Danish soldiers died in those wars. And if this is how your ally treats you, then of course, it’s a very bad thing.
But at the same time, on a global level, this isn’t about Greenland — it’s about the security architecture in the Arctic. So, as a businessman, Trump tends to say something extreme and then begin negotiations, eventually ending up somewhere closer to the position he really wants. That’s why we shouldn’t lose our minds over a few such comments, but rather approach them as rationally as possible. Everything is very unpredictable, and it’s unclear which of Trump’s ideas will actually become reality in the coming months. But we’re hearing different solutions from European politicians. Some say we must take this very seriously, others say we shouldn’t take it too literally. It’s all part of broader negotiations — and everything in between.
But you still have to scale up the defense industry and invest in protection, because we know that Trump is a gambler. We don’t know what to expect from him, so we must be ready for anything — both an increase in aid and the possibility that he might cancel support for Ukraine altogether. Alright, I have a few more questions for you. While preparing for this interview, I noticed that the amount of aid provided to Afghanistan significantly exceeded the investments in assistance to Ukraine — even though Ukraine is fighting a truly large-scale war against a much bigger country than us, a country with nuclear weapons, a country that is asking North Korea for help. At the same time, we are saving money for the entire European Union — because, as Mark Rutte said, if Ukraine loses, NATO will have to spend trillions on its own security. Why do you think there is such a gap between the aid given to Afghanistan and the aid given to Ukraine?
— I think part of it has to do with the fact that many soldiers were sent to Afghanistan, and the biggest expense in any military operation is the salaries of the people sent on missions. So I think that automatically skews the amount of money spent by the United States in Afghanistan compared to the money spent in Ukraine. I believe that’s part of the issue. And also the shifting world order.
So I believe the Trump administration views this (Russia’s war against Ukraine — ed.) as a European conflict rather than a global one, and they are stepping back from involvement. Personally, I try to convince everyone that this is truly part of the global arena — at the very least, just look at the North Korean soldiers who are present on Ukrainian territory. But at that time, I think the U.S. viewed Afghanistan as part of the global arena in which they had to participate. Now, the current U.S. administration sees things differently. I think those two reasons play a significant role.
Do you think that if the Biden administration had given Ukraine more weapons and more money, we would have defeated Russia in 2023? Personally, I believe that Ukraine would have beaten Russia, but the problem lies in the Biden administration, which was very slow in making decisions about providing aid. Do you think this is the reason why we now have such a difficult situation on the front line?
— It also has to do with restrictions on weapons, because many types of weapons that were provided couldn’t be used to their full potential. That matters, too. I sometimes say, both in the Netherlands and in Europe, that we have given Ukraine just enough support not to lose the war — but clearly not enough to win it. And that is a huge mistake.
You predicted my final question. Do you think the West has a strategic goal — Ukraine’s victory?
— Personally, I do have that goal. And every politician from VOLT — the party I represent — also shares this objective. It’s hard to say the same about the entire West, because the West as a whole consists of many different political leaders and governments that think differently. But I still believe there is a large group of Western countries that fully support Ukraine. And I hope that we can step up this support by doing what I have already mentioned — direct investments in Ukraine’s defense industry, seizing Russian assets and transferring them to Ukraine, and accelerating all these actions.
And if we also weaken the operations of the Russian «shadow fleet» and reduce our purchases of LNG from Russia — which we are, obviously, still buying, and if we do all this quickly enough, then we can still win. I believe in that. And I hope that our — and your — ability to convince Western leaders who still don’t believe in it will grow, so that in the end, we will succeed.
Hanna Soloviova, Guildhall News Agency, exclusive.